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but the child with whom the choice rests cannot be expected to view
it that way.
It seems that a better method could be devised than one which places
so much emphasis on the choice of the child. Restoring the court's dis-
cretion would be a step in the right direction. The use of specially
trained workers to thoroughly investigate the facts surrounding each
case would be helpful.'" In any event we should remember that proper
custody is important to the child and to society as well and merits more
consideration than the mechanical solution furnished by Ohio G.C.
sec. 8033. J. P. M.
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
In an action for personal injuries caused by the defendant's auto-
mobile, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to introduce in evidence
a hospital record showing the value of services rendered by the hospital
and containing on its face the notation "Man promised to pay hospital
bill." The Supreme Court held that the admission of such record over
objection duly made was reversible error.'
The term "hospital records" in general means the records and charts
kept as a part of the case history of all patients in the hospital.2 They
are usually made by several doctors and nurses who at various times
enter on these records items which pertain to the care or progress of
the patient. It is obvious that if the record is offered as evidence wvithout
calling all of the individuals who made the notations or entries it is
hearsay, and also it is inadmissible unless it can be placed under some
exception to the hearsay rule.
In the principal case the Supreme Court said that the trial court
had admitted the hospital record on the basis of the so-called shop book
rule, and that under this doctrine such records were not admissible
because the hospital was not a party.' Admitting this, it does not follow
that the record might not be admissible under some other exception to
the hearsay rule.
The common law recognized an exception for entries in the usual
1 OHio G. C. sec 11979-4, which provides that the court may, in its discretion,
appoint one of its officers to make an investigation as to the character, family relations,
past conduct, earning ability and financial worth of the parties in divorce or alimony
cases, is suggestive of what might be done along this line in connection with problems
involving the custody of children.
'Petterson v. Lake, 136 Ohio St. 481, z6 N.E. (2d) 763 (1940).
2AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, tit. HosP1TALs, sec. 6.
'Peterson v. Lake, 136 Ohio St. 481, 483, z6 N.E. (2d) 763 (1940).
course of business, if the absence of the persons who made the entries
was accounted for, and if there was a circumstantial probability of
trustwvorthiness.4 As to the first requirement, necessity, the calling of
all the doctors and nurses who had helped make the record would be
a serious interference with the conduct of the hospital as well as a
practical impossibility. As to the second requirement, circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness, the records are relied upon every day by
the hospital staff as being truthful. In Ohio a hospital record was
admitted on this ground, the court saying in Kellogg v. Industrial Corn-
mission' that where a hospital record satisfies the requirements of
necessity and trustworthiness which form the basis for the exception to
the hearsay rule, it is admissible. In Pickering v. Peskind the court
held that hospital records kept in the regular and usual course of
business were admissible to show the age of the plaintiff, it being shown
that it was the rule of the hospital that the age of the patient be recorded.
Hospital records have also been admitted in Ohio under the public
document exception to the hearsay rule. In Cassidy v. Cincinnati
Traction Co.' the court said the "Statutory provision for the main-
tenance and control of a free public hospital .. , and a rule requiring
the receiving physician to make a written report . . . , renders such
report a public document or record, and therefore admissible. . . ." In
neither this case nor the cases where the record was admitted as an
entry in the usual course of business was the hospital a party to the action.
But it does not follow from these cases that Ohio has admitted
everything found on a hospital record. In Reed v. Henzel' the portion
of a hospital record relative to the diagnosis of the plaintiff's case was
admitted, but a portion was excluded which contained statements made
by the plaintiff's daughter as to the cause of the accident and of the
effect on her father, the court saying that it was an attempt to introduce
pure hearsay since the statements did not refer to any transaction
occurring in the course of the public duty of anyone connected with the
hospital. In Netzel v. Todd' a hospital record was offered to show the
character of an operation on the plaintiff, but the record was held
inadmissible because there was no evidence as to who made the record
or from what source the information was derived.
'WIIMORsE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940), sees. z521, 2szz and 1707.
'6o Ohio App. 22, 13 Ohio Op. 384, 59 N.E. (zd) Sn (1938).
0 43 Ohio App. 401, 31 Ohio L. Rep. 439 (1930)-
7 2s Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 125, 29 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 6 (1917).
s26 Ohio App. 79, z59 N.E. 843 (1927).
) 30 Ohio App. zoo, 165 N.E. 47 (1928). See Dickson v. Gastl, 64 Ohio App. 346,
IS Ohio Op. 142, -N.E. (2d)- (1940), where the court held that statements on the
hospital record given to the attendant as to the nature of his injuries and the manner of
receiving them were self-serving and lacked the elements of trustworthiness and necessity
upon which the entries in hospital records are admissible.
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These cases would seem to indicate that parts of hospital records,
at least, have been admitted if a proper foundation has been laid and
if the items were those usually contained in hospital records.
In other jurisdictions there is some conflict as to whether such
hospital records are admissible at all, although it would seem that a
larger number of courts would admit hospital records as evidence."0
In the jurisdictions which have refused to admit such evidence there
is confusion as to reason; in some cases it seems that the only reason
for so holding was the lack of a proper foundation for admitting it
under an exception to the hearsay rule. 1
In 1939 the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed the Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Act' which was designed to
facilitate proof of various business records. The purpose of the act was
to permit the proof of various records on the evidence of the custodian,
or the person who made the record, or the one under whose supervision
the record was made, without calling for the attendance of everyone
who contributed to it. If such people are called, they can usually add
little or nothing to the record and their attendance would tend to disrupt
the orderly procedure of the institution from which they were called.
The hospital record in the principal case would seem to fall squarely
within the provision of this act, for the cashier was the custodian of the
record and testified that the record was made in the regular course of
business. It would seem that in a new trial of the principal case that
the record should be admitted. It may be that the statement "Man
promised to pay hospital bill" is objectionable because it is not the usual
type of entry in a hospital bill, but this scarcely seems a justification for
barring the whole record. It is to be hoped that the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act will receive a more liberal construction in
the future. F.A.R.
PRESUMPTIONS -BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW NEGLIGENCE
OR LACK OF NEGLIGENCE IN CASE OF STOLEN CAR
The owner of an automobile parked it in a garage for the day, as
was his custom. In the evening he returned and demanded his car but
the garageman could not deliver it, since it had been stolen during the
day. The insurance company paid the owner for his loss, became
subrogated to his rights and sued the garage for negligence in permit-
ting the car to be stolen. At the trial the evidence was not clear as to
'
0 See 75 A.L.R. 378 and 1zo A.L.R. 2224.
'See 7S A.L.R. 378, 386 and xzo A.L.R. 1124, 1136.
" Olo GENERAL CODE, See. 12102-23.
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whether the car was actually in the garage at the time it was stolen,
there being some evidence that it had been taken out at least once
during the day by an employee of the owner. Assuming that the car
was in the garage at the time it was stolen, the trial court charged that
upon demand by the owner and a refusal to deliver by the garage, there
arose a presumption of negligence against the bailee, that this was met
by a showing that the car had been stolen, and then the burden was
on the bailor to show that the bailee was negligent. On appeal this
statement of the amount of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption
was repudiated, but the decision was sustained because of insufficient
proof that the car was in the garage at the time it was stolen.1
The case is important because of its discussion of the weight to be
given a presumption. It is universally agreed that "a 'presumption' may
be used to designate the assumption of the existence of one fact which
the law requires the trier of fact to make on account of the existence
of another fact or group of facts, standing alone." 2 Thus, where fact
C is necessary to be proved, if a party proves the existence of facts A
and B, fact C is presumed to exist. Once the presumption is admitted
to exist, the authorities differ as to its function and the amount of
evidence necessary to meet it.'
Professor Wigmore holds that a presumption is merely a procedural
device which, while it shifts the burden of going forward with the
production of more evidence, never shifts the burden of proof. As soon
as the party against whom the presumption operates produces some
evidence to the contrary, the presumption vanishes and the case pro-
ceeds as if the presumption had never arisen.4 This view is apparently
the one adopted by Thayer.' It is the orthodox view and is followed by
several states' and by the United States Supreme Court.'
'The North River Insurance Co. of New York v. Ohmer, D.B.A. The Ohmer
Garage, 63 Ohio App. 346 (i939).
" Morgan, Some Obscrations Concerning Presumptions (931) 44 HARV. L. REV.
9o6.
. 0One ventures the assertion that 'presumptions' is the slipperiest member of the
family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof'." McCormick, Charges on
Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5 N.C.L.REv. z9i, z95.
'The effect of the presumption is "merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the
jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent.
If the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the judge's require-
ment of some evidence) the presumption disappears as a rule of law, and the case is in the
jury', hands free from any rule." 9 WIoIAoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) see. 249!.
r:THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) p. 313.
"Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Taylor, iz9 Ala. z38 (59o); State v. Gargano, 99 Conn.
103, 121 Atl. 657 (19z3); Graves v. Colwell, 9 Ill. 61z (1878); Moore v. Ryan, 188
Ind. 345, 123 N.E. 642 (1919); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tnggles' Adm'r, 254 Ky. 814
(1914.); Gaffney v. Coffey, Si N.H. 300, 124 Atl. 788 (1924); Kennell v. Rider, 225
App. Div. 391, 233 N.Y. Supp. 252 (1929); Clark v. Feldman, 57 N.D. 741 (1929);
Brov.n v. Henderson z85 Mass. 592, 289 N.E. 41 (1934).
1 Nev York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161, 8z L.Ed. 7z6, 58 Sup. Ct. oo
(x 9 3 S); "Inferences and presumptions speak in the absence of evidence, but cannot be
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Other authorities are inclined not to limit the effect of the presump-
tion so much. Professor Morgan says that there is nothing inherent in
a presumption to keep it from having probative value and that where
a presumption is applicable at all, it should continue to operate against
the party until he has produced at least enough evidence which, when
weighed in the minds of the jury, will convince them at least that the
nonexistence of the presumed fact is as probable as its existence. He
contends that such a view would not contravene the dogma that the
burden of proof must never shift.' But there are instances when in the
interest of public policy, the presumption should even shift the burden
of proof. His views apparently are shared by other writers.' And many
cases do expressly or impliedly give weight to a presumption."0
In the principal case the Court of Appeals held that where the
owner of an automobile leaves it with a garage, a bailor-bailee relation-
ship arises, and that when the garage cannot return the car on demand,
the law raises a presumption that this failure is due to the negligence
of the bailee. In' this view practically all courts and writers concur,
though cases will be found where the bailee is not even presumed to
be negligent.1 While nearly all courts agree that the presumption
places on the bailee the burden of going forward with the evidence,
they do not agree as to the degree of proof necessary to dissipate the
presumption or to counterbalance it. Under the Wigmore theory it
would seem that the production of any evidence at all would satisfy
this requirement. When the bailee has shown that the goods bailed have
been destroyed by fire or stolen he has satisfied the requirement and
the burden then shifts back to the bailor to go forward with more
evidence and to prove that the bailee was negligent. In the principal
case the lower court held this view of the law. By the great weight
of authority this is the law."2 But the upper court held that this was
weighed in the balance as against evidence." Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis and St.
L. R. Co., 36 F. (zd) 747 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930), cert. denied, z81 U.S. 756.
' Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof (933) 47
HARv. L. Rrv. 59- .
'See McCormick, op. cit., and Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
upon Burden of Proof (192o) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 307-
"Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., z2z Cal. 540, z99 Pac. sz9 (5935); People v.
Chamberlin, 7 Cal. (zd) z57, 6o P. (zd) 299 (1936); Freeman v. Blount, 17 i Ala. 655(igiz); City Motor Trucking Co. v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., ix6 Ore. soz (9zS);
Sather v. Giaconi, iSo Ore. 433 (924) (Whether or not presumption has been overcome
is jury question); Johnson v. Johnson, 187 Ill. 86 (i9oo); Clifford v. Taylor, zo4 Mass.
358 (19io).
'Knights v. Piella, 69 N.W. 92 (Mich. 2896); Mills v. Gilbreth, 47 Me. 320
(s86o); Staley v. Colony Union Gin Co., z63 S.w. 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
"Carscallen v. Lakeside Highway District, z6o Pac. s6z (Idaho 1927); Hogan v.
O'Brien, 2o8 N.Y. Supp. 477 (i925), Galowitz v. Magner, 203 N.Y. Supp. 421, zo8 App.
Div. 6 (1924); Metropolitan Electric Service Co. v. Walker, so, Okla. ioz, az6 Pac.
1042 (5924); Munger Auto Co. v. American Lloyds, 267 S.,v. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 9,4-).
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not enough. It did not find it necessary to determine how much evi-
dence the bailee must produce, it merely stated that the presumption
of his negligence had not been met when he showed that the car had
been stolen.' 3
Judge Learned Hand, while holding that the presumption is merely
a procedural device, has expressed an opinion that is in accord with the
view taken by the Court of Appeals in the principal case-that a mere
showing that the property is not returned because of theft will not
satisf
, 
the presumption of negligence against the bailee. In a case where
a barge sank while in the custody of the bailee, and the bailor sued the
bailee for damages alleging negligence, Judge Hand stated that the
bailee to meet the presumption of negligence must show how the loss
or damage occurred, or that it was not due to the bailee's negligence,
or, as an alternative, the bailee could prove everything which had hap-
pened to the barge while it was in the bailee's custody. If the bailee
accounts for every minute of time and all occurrences, and there is no
evidence of his negligence, he has met the presumption; if he does not
account for all the time and the injury or loss may have occurred during
the time unaccounted for, he has not met the presumption.' 4
This view approaches the view held by Professor Morgan and
Professor Bohlen. Each of these writers holds that in certain instances
the presumption should go to the jury as probative evidence. One such
instance is the case of bailed property where all the circumstances
surrounding the loss are peculiarly within the knowledge of the bailee
and, because of the relationship, it would be virtually impossible for the
baior to show any negligence.'" To allow the bailee to meet the
presumption of his negligence merely by showing that the bailed goods
have been stolen would seem to place on the bailor a task almost
impossible to accomplish since it is most unlikely that he will have any
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the loss. Professor Morgan
would relieve the bailor by allowing the presumption of the bailee's
"The North River Insurance Co. of New York v. Ohmer, D.B.A. Ohmer Garage,
63 Ohio App. 346 (1939)i (Burden on bailee to show due care to keep goods from being
stolen); Savin v. Butler, x9 Ohio App. 68 (1924); Rudy v. Quincy Market Cold Storage
and Warehoue Co., 249 Mass. 49z (924) (Statute shifted burden of proof to bailee).
"Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Penn. R. R., 6o F. (2d) 734 (C.C.A. zd, 193z) "The
presumption on which the bailor may rely is a mere rule for the conduct of the trial. It
puts upon the bailee the risk of a directed verdict if he does not meet it, but it does no
more; once he has done so, it disappears from the case. Thus it can never concern the
jury; if the judge is satisfied that the bailee has met the presumption by substantial
evidence, the bailor has lost his initial advantage; he must prove the issue, which is the
bailee's fault, though he may use the bailee's evidence, so far as it will help him, which
,rdinarily it will not." p. 736; see also Cummings v. Penn. R. R., 45 F. (zd) isz (C.C.
A. 2d, 1930).
'ZSee Bohlen, op. cit., and Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions
(xg3) 44 HARv. L. REv. 906.
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negligence to persist and go to the jury, and the bailee must produce
enough evidence that he was not negligent to convince the jury of that
fact. 6 If we say that the amount of evidence necessary is just enough
to counterbalance the presumption, we are still within the limits of the
dogma that the burden of persuasion does not shift from the bailor;
if we say that to produce enough evidence to convince the jury that
there was no negligence does actually shift the burden of persuasion, it
would seem that in equity no violence has been done, since the bailee
having knowledge of all the circumstances should be able to show that
he was not negligent if, in fact, he were not. D. R. T.
INSURANCE
INTERIM INSURANCE ARISING FROM ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
RECEIPT
Twenty days before his death, Dell B. Duncan, deceased husband
of the plaintiff,' applied in writing for a life insurance policy with the
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, paid an advance
premium of one dollar and designated the plaintiff, his wife, as bene-
ficiary. The insurance company was investigating the applicant's occu-
pation at the time of his death, but had taken no other action on the
application, either by way of acceptance or rejection. In her suit to
collect the amount of insurance applied for ($720.00), the plaintiff
contended that the provisions of a preliminary receipt2 issued at the time
of the application created a present contract of interim or temporary
insurance.
The Supreme Court of Ohio construed the receipt' as providing
temporary protection commencing immediately upon the signing of the
application and payment of the premium. This interim insurance was
to continue until such time as the insurer had considered the application
and announced its determination to accept or reject the risk. One clause
" Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1933) 4.7
HARv. L. REV. 59.
'Duncan v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 44 (940).
'The receipt issued by the insurer provided that "it is understood and agreed that no
liability is assumed by the company on account of this payment nor until it shall issue a
policy, but if death occurs after the date of the application from which this receipt is
detached and prior to the date of issue of such policy, payment in accordance with and
subject to the conditions and provisions of the policy applied for shall be made; provided
the applicant is insurable under the company's rules and the application is approved and
accepted by it at its home offices as to plan, premium and amount of insurance. If a policy
is issued, the deposit will be applied to payment of the premiums thereon from its date,
otherwise the deposit will be returned to the payer thereof upon surrender of this receipt."
3 Ibid.
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